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S U M M A R Y
Early studies that explored host–pathogen interactions assumed that infected individuals within a
population have equal chances of transmitting the infection to others. Subsequently, in what became
known as the 20/80 rule, a small percentage of individuals within any population was observed to
control most transmission events. This empirical rule was shown to govern inter-individual
transmission dynamics for many pathogens in several species, and individuals who infect
disproportionately more secondary contacts, as compared to most others, became known as super-
spreaders. Studies conducted in the wake of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic
revealed that, in the absence of super-spreading events, most individuals infect few, if any, secondary
contacts. The analysis of SARS transmission, and reports from other outbreaks, unveil a complex scenario
in which super-spreading events are shaped by multiple factors, including co-infection with another
pathogen, immune suppression, changes in airﬂow dynamics, delayed hospital admission, misdiagnosis,
and inter-hospital transfers. Predicting and identifying super-spreaders open signiﬁcant medical and
public health challenges, and represent important facets of infectious disease management and
pandemic preparedness plans.
 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
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Many early studies on infectious disease epidemiology as-
sumed that susceptible hosts within a population had equal
chances of becoming infected.1 Subsequent observations unveiled
marked heterogeneities in pathogen transmission, with some
individuals exhibiting a higher ability to infect others. In what
became known as the 20/80 rule, a concept documented by
observational and modeling studies and having profound implica-
tions for infection control, 20% of the individuals within any given
population are thought to contribute at least 80% to the
transmission potential of a pathogen,2 and many host–pathogen
interactions were found to follow this empirical rule.
A fundamental epidemiological parameter used to characterize
infectious disease outbreaks, at the population level, is the basic
reproductive number, R0, which expresses the mean number of
secondary infections generated during the entire infectious period
of an infected individual. While R0 is valuable in assessing outbreak
severity, and its beneﬁts in guiding public health interventions
cannot be overemphasized,3,4 this population estimate, as recently
pointed out, could obscure inter-individual variations in infec-
tiousness that were described for many infectious diseases.5 In
addition to population-wide measures of pathogen transmission,
estimates of inter-individual variability should therefore be
incorporated into analyses describing host–pathogen dynamics.E-mail address: ras2@princeton.edu.
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infectious diseases
The minority of individuals who infect disproportionately more
susceptible contacts, as compared to most individuals who infect
few or no others, became known as super-spreaders, and their
existence is deeply rooted in history: between 1900 and 1907,
Typhoid Mary infected 51 individuals, three of whom died, even
though she only had an asymptomatic infection.6
Super-spreaders were described for many infectious diseases. In
1992, 41 of the 97 contacts of an index person with cavitary
tuberculosis from a Minnesota bar tested positive, and 14 (14%)
developed active tuberculosis, despite the fact that only 1–2% of
infectious patients’ close contacts normally develop tuberculosis.7
This super-spreader alone contributed with 35% of all new active
tuberculosis cases from Minneapolis during 1992. In July 1998, a 9-
year-old child from North Dakota, whose female guardian had been
diagnosed with extrapulmonary tuberculosis, was found to have
bilateral cavitary infection, and 56 (20%) of his school contacts had a
positive tuberculin skin test and were presumed infected.
Nevertheless, his twin brother had a mild case and was not
infectious.8 This is even more remarkable, considering that children
with tuberculosis have few bacilli in their lesions, often do not
produce sputum, and rarely have communicable disease.9–11 In
1989, at a high school in Finland, one student infected 22 others
with measles, even though eight of the contacts were vaccinated,
one of them twice,12 and during the 1995 Ebola hemorrhagic fever
outbreak from Kikwit, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,13 twoternational Society for Infectious Diseases.
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represented the source of infection for over 50 secondary cases.
Several studies found increased urethral HIV shedding in individu-
als co-infected with other sexually transmitted pathogens; for
example, an eight-fold higher HIV shedding was reported in men
with urethritis as compared to men without urethritis having
similar circulatory viral burdens, and in men with gonorrhea, HIV
shedding decreased subsequent to antibiotic treatment.14–16 A
heterosexual man co-infected with HIV, hepatitis C virus, and
herpes simplex 2 virus had unusually high semen HIV RNA levels,
which exceeded plasma levels by one order of magnitude, and were
explained by recurrent asymptomatic herpes infections.17Maternal
herpes virus infection was associated with increased perinatal and
intrapartum HIV transmission,18,19 and herpes virus suppressive
therapy was shown to reduce HIV shedding in dually infected
women.20
3. Super-spreaders during the SARS pandemic
The concept of super-spreaders re-surfaced in the context of
another recent infectious disease. During the 2002–2003 SARS
outbreaks, not all patients harboring the virus were equally
infectious. The majority had very low infectivity, and super-
spreading events represented one of the most particular features of
this outbreak.21 A stochastic model that analyzed 1512 patients
from the ﬁrst 10 weeks of the Hong Kong SARS pandemic22 showed
that the virus was moderately transmissible, with 2.7 secondary
infections for every index case, when excluding super-spreading
events. A similar modeling of the Singapore outbreak23 revealed
that in a fully susceptible population that has not yet implemented
infection control, an individual would infect approximately three
secondary contacts. In fact, among the ﬁrst 201 probable SARS
patients in Singapore, 81% had no evidence of infecting others, but
ﬁve individuals infected 10 or more secondary contacts each.23,24
By using mathematical and statistical analyses, Li et al. found that
approximately 71% and 75% of the infections from Hong Kong and
Singapore, respectively, were attributable to super-spreader
events, and suggested that delaying hospital admission more than
4 days after the onset of symptoms could partly be responsible for
super-spreading events, underscoring the importance of early
diagnosis and isolation.21
The analysis of a transmission chain early during the Beijing SARS
outbreak revealed that from 77 patients examined, 66 did not infect
others, and seven infected three individuals or fewer each, but four
patients infected eight or more contacts each and were considered
super-spreaders.25 This study revealed that high numbers of close
contacts represent a risk factor for super-spreading events.25
Another risk factor for super-spreading events emerges from the
report of a 54-year-old male who presented on April 15 to Pingjin
Hospital in China, seeking treatment for coronary heart disease, type
II diabetes, and chronic renal failure.26 Subsequent to his admission
the same day, the patient developed fever, myalgia and a sore throat,
and a physician later suspected SARS based on previous contact with
a SARS patient in another hospital. On April 17, the patient was
transferred to the Tianjin Thorax Disease Hospital and received
treatment for two days, and on April 19 he was again transferred to
the Tianjin Infectious Disease Hospital, where he died. Only in
Pingjin Hospital, this patient directly infected 33 others. Implement-
ing active surveillance, limiting inter-hospital transfers, and
quarantining patients who could have been exposed, emerge as
important lessons from this experience.
At least two super-spreading events were described in Hong
Kong.21 In the Prince of Wales Hospital, the index patient was a 26-
year-old man admitted on March 4, 2003 who, as part of his right
upper lobe pneumonia treatment, was administered bronchodi-
lators via a nebulizer. Together with overcrowding and an outdatedventilation system, this is thought to have facilitated the spread of
the virus. Within the next two weeks, 156 individuals, including
hospital staff, patients, and visitors, were admitted to the hospital,
all of them traceable to this patient, and SARS was diagnosed in 138
of them.27–29
The index patient in the second super-spreader outbreak was an
individual on hemodialysis for chronic renal failure who had
diarrhea and, on two occasions, stayed with his brother in Block E
in the Amoy Gardens residential complex.30,31 Amoy Gardens has
19 residential blocks, with eight apartments on each of the 33
ﬂoors.31 In several bathrooms from block E, it was reported that the
U-shaped traps linking the vertical drainage pipes, known as risers,
to the sanitary ﬁxtures, did not function properly. As a result, when
water ﬂowed down, the backﬂow from the risers was able to
generate aerosols and spread pathogens into individual bath-
rooms. In addition, powerful window fans installed by residents in
many bathrooms created a signiﬁcant negative pressure that
ampliﬁed the aerosol backﬂow. In the Amoy Gardens complex
outbreak, 329 individuals were infected and 42 died.32 The cases
occurred in clusters, at speciﬁc ﬂoor levels, in a pattern that simple
person-to-person transmission could not explain, and an epide-
miological investigation proposed, as a plausible explanation, a
common source of exposure for all infected individuals.33
Approximately 45% of the infections occurred in Block E, the
same block that the index patient visited, and approximately 60%
were within ﬂats 7 and 8, bordering the speciﬁc vertical riser
thought to be involved. An investigation found that the index
patient had very high concentrations of virus in the urine and feces,
and proposed that aerosolization as a result of the hydraulic effect
inside drainage pipes facilitated the spread of the pathogen.32 This
outbreak revealed the importance of taking indoor air quality and
building ventilation into account when exploring the dynamics of
airborne pathogens. It was, in addition, suggested that in certain
individuals, immune system defects could increase the viral load
and make them become super-spreaders, as could have happened
with the index patient who was undergoing hemodialysis, which is
known to impair both innate and adaptive immunity.27,34
An interesting observation came from the Vietnam outbreak.
When on March 12, 2003 the Vietnam French Hospital in Hanoi
was closed for new admissions and 33 patients were admitted to
another hospital until May 2, no nosocomial infections were
reported in the second hospital and none of its healthcare workers
became ill with a condition that resembled SARS,35 revealing that
in the absence of super-spreading events, most patients do not
infect others.
4. Super-spreaders in other species
Super-spreaders are not limited to humans. Capparelli and
collaborators36 examined water buffaloes from an area in Italy
endemic for brucellosis, and found that while most infected
animals shed Brucella abortus at low levels in their milk, a few
animals shed large numbers of bacteria. Kilpatrick et al.37 showed
that mosquitoes infected with West Nile virus feed on American
robins (Turdus migratorius), a species that represented 4% of the
avian abundance, approximately 17 times more frequently than
expected by chance, revealing strong heterogeneities that exist in
the transmission of this pathogen. In a study that examined Sin
Nombre Virus transmission among deer mice, which usually
requires direct contact such as biting or scratching, Clay et al.
described signiﬁcant heterogeneities in the contact frequency and
contact length between hosts, and showed that a small percentage
of animals controls most transmission events.38 A cross-sectional
survey conducted on 474 Scottish cattle farms by Matthews et al.39
unveiled marked differences in infectiousness, with approximately
20% of the most infectious animals being responsible for
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ventions targeted to the 5% most infectious individuals could
reduce R0 to values lower than 1. Fecal sample analysis conducted
at a UK abattoir revealed that approximately 9% of the cattle
examined over a 9-week period were high Escherichia coli O157
shedders (>104 CFU/g) and they accounted for over 96% of the
bacteria shed by all animals tested,40 and a survey of Salmonella
enterica serovar Typhimurium fecal shedding by mice identiﬁed a
subset of animals that shed high numbers of bacteria (>108 CFU/g),
a phenotype linked to the presence of two bacterial virulence
determinants, the SPI1 and SPI2 pathogenicity islands.41
5. What makes a super-spreader?
It is still unclear why certain individuals infect disproportion-
ately large numbers of secondary contacts. Increased strain
virulence, higher pathogen shedding, and differences in the host–
pathogen relationship were advanced as potential explanations.13,42
An interesting observation comes from the 2003 Hong Kong
outbreak, where a ‘runny nose’, unusual for SARS, was described
in a super-spreader, fueling the hypothesis that patients with
slightly different symptoms, perhaps as a result of co-infection with
another microorganism, could become super-spreaders.43 In 1960,
Eichenwald and collaborators described ‘cloud babies’ – infants who,
in nurseries, after infection with a respiratory virus, became highly
contagious and were able to spread Staphylococcus aureus they were
colonized with,44 and the same phenomenon was more recently
described in adults.45 In early 1983, a nurse colonized intranasally
with S. aureus was linked to staphylococcal skin infection outbreaks
in two nurseries from two different Florida hospitals. It was
subsequently revealed that during each of the two outbreaks, she
had an upper respiratory tract infection, and phage typing conﬁrmed
the identity between the strain she was colonized with and the ones
causing the outbreaks.46 A physician colonized intranasally with S.
aureus exhibited a 40-fold increased airborne dispersal afterTable 1
Super-spreading events are shaped by host, pathogen, and environmental factors. Ofte
Factors Categories 
Host Physiological 
Behavioral 
Immunological 
Pathogen Virulence 
Co-infection 
Environment Crowding 
Unrecognized/misdiagnosed
disease
Inter-hospital transfers 
Building ventilation/airﬂow
dynamics
SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
Data in the table were compiled from references 16–19, 26, 32, 33, 37, 38, 41, and 43–acquiring an upper respiratory rhinovirus infection, becoming thus
a ‘cloud adult’,47 and a study that examined volunteers with S. aureus
nasal carriage revealed, on average, a two-fold increase in bacterial
dispersion into the air after rhinovirus infection, with up to 34-fold
higher dispersion observed in one volunteer.48 This process is
mechanistically insufﬁciently understood, and one scenario that
was proposed is that rhinovirus-induced swelling of the nasal
turbinates could create a high-speed airﬂow that establishes
aerosols.47
The observation that sterile clothing, but not a sterile mask, often
reduces S. aureus airborne dispersal in rhinovirus-infected individ-
uals, pointed towards a possible initial effect that rhinoviruses exert
locally, followed by the subsequent colonization of the skin and
clothing, which could serve as reservoirs and subsequently amplify
the airborne dissemination of staphylococci.48,49 Bischoff et al.
proposed that sneezing contributes to pathogen dispersal, and
several groups of individuals, including those with respiratory
allergies, could thus become potential sources of airborne bacteria.50
Two major questions surrounding super-spreaders persist as
important gaps in our knowledge, and the answers have
fundamental public health implications. What makes certain hosts
become super-spreaders, and how can we identify them in a timely
manner? Models that do not take into consideration transmission
heterogeneity and super-spreading events will inaccurately
portray pathogen dynamics and hinder the successful implemen-
tation of infection control strategies.1 On the other hand,
identifying the 20% of the hosts that are super-spreaders would
enable control over approximately 80% of the pathogen transmis-
sion events in the population. As it is apparent from the examples
presented above, each outbreak offers speciﬁc insights into factors
that might shape super-spreading events. It is imperative to
explore all facets of host and pathogen biology, as well as
environmental factors that might shape their interaction, and
analyze the observations provided by previous outbreaks (Table 1).
All these examples are becoming fundamental teachings that haven, more than one factor may be implicated in the same outbreak.
Examples
Compared to other avian species, American robins appear
to be responsible for the majority of West Nile virus-infected
mosquitoes, and act as a species equivalent of a super-spreader
Contact length and contact frequency between hosts were
implicated in shaping the Sin Nombre virus transmission among
deer mice
Decreased immunity in a patient receiving hemodialysis was
linked to a super-spreading event in the Amoy Gardens,
Hong Kong SARS outbreak
Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium SPI1 and SPI2
pathogenicity islands were associated with super-spreading
‘Cloud babies’ and ‘cloud adults’ are individuals who, after
rhinovirus infection, efﬁciently spread S. aureus that they are
colonized with, and infect others in their environment.
HIV shedding is higher in people co-infected with other sexually
transmitted diseases, and treatment of those diseases often
reduces shedding
A study of the Beijing SARS outbreak revealed that in three
super spreading events, the average number of contacts was 24
In a patient admitted to a Beijing hospital, SARS was initially
misdiagnosed for tuberculosis
During the SARS outbreak, several patients with previous
SARS contacts were admitted for unrelated complaints
and were subsequently transferred between hospitals,
infecting others
In the Amoy Gardens residential complex, building ventilation
was one of the factors thought to have facilitated the
initial SARS transmission to at least 187 individuals
48.
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emerging infectious diseases and in developing robust pandemic
preparedness plans.
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